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The goal of this experimental project was to investigate lay peoples’ perceptions of
epistemic authority (EA) in the field of finance. EA is defined as the extent to which
a source of information is treated as evidence for judgments independently of its
objective expertise and based on subjective beliefs. Previous research suggested that
EA evaluations are biased and that lay people tend to ascribe higher EA to experts who
advise action (in the case of medical experts) or confirm clients’ expectations (in the
case of politicians). However, there has been no research into biases in lay evaluations
of financial experts and this project is aimed to fill this gap. Experiment 1 showed that lay
people tended to ascribe greater authority to financial consultants who gave more active
advice to clients considering taking out a mortgage. Experiment 2 confirmed the action
advice effect found in Experiment 1. However, the outcomes of Experiments 2 and –
particularly – 3 suggested that this bias might also be due to clients’ desire to confirm
their own opinions. Experiment 2 showed that the action advice effect was moderated
by clients’ own opinions on taking loans. Lay people ascribed the greatest EA to the
advisor in the scenario in which he advised taking action and where this coincided with
the client’s positive opinion on the advisability of taking out a loan. In Experiment 3 only
participants with a positive opinion on the financial product ascribed greater authority
to experts who recommended it; participants whose opinion was negative tended to
rate consultants who advised rejecting the product more highly. To conclude, these
three experiments revealed that lay people ascribe higher EA to financial consultants
who advise action rather than maintenance of the status quo, but this effect is limited by
confirmation bias: when the client’s a priori opinion is salient, greater authority is ascribed
to experts whose advice confirms it. In this sense, results presented in the present paper
suggest that the action advice effect might be also interpreted as a specific manifestation
of confirmation bias.
Keywords: financial advice, epistemic authority, action advice effect, confirmation bias, judgment, motivation,
financial services
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INTRODUCTION
Bernard Madoff became one of the dark symbols of the recent
global financial crisis. In 2009 he pleaded guilty to creating one
of the biggest investment frauds in the history of international
finance and was sentenced to 150 years in prison. His wealth
management business, which was in fact a massive Ponzi scheme
(Frankel, 2012), defrauded 10s of 1000s of investors of billions
of dollars. Madoff’s clients included not just individual investors,
but also banks, hedge funds, and charities (McCool and Graybow,
2009). One of the questions asked by journalists and market
commentators was how could Madoff have been so successful
in deceiving so many people? Why did so many individual and
institutional investors recognize him as an expert? Why were
people ready to trust him and follow his recommendations?
These questions are important to the Madoff case but might also
be posed in more general terms. Why and when are consumers
willing to believe an individual has financial expertise and to
entrust financial advisors with their money – sometimes their
life savings? What characteristics make financial advisors more
competent and trustworthy in the eyes of their clients? The aim
of the research presented in this paper was to find answers to these
questions, which are of practical as well as theoretical importance.
The data we collected in a series of three experiments suggest that
lay people tend to judge financial consultants as more competent
when they advice action rather than inaction and when their
recommendations confirm lay people’s naïve opinions.
Lay perceptions of expert knowledge have been considered
from a theoretical point of view in the lay epistemic theory
proposed by Kruglanski (1989, 2012). Lay epistemic theory
introduced the concept of epistemic authority (EA), defining
it as “the extent to which an individual is inclined to treat
a source’s information as incontrovertible evidence for her or
his judgment” (Kruglanski, 2012, p. 212). The term EA is used
to refer to subjective beliefs about a source of knowledge or
expertise. Sources can acquire EA to the extent that an individual
believes that they possess characteristics that give them such
authority (Raviv et al., 1993). In other words, EA comprises the
level of knowledge which individuals attribute to the source, the
degree to which they trust the source’s knowledge, are willing to
change their opinions under the influence of the source, and are
willing to change their behavior under the influence of the source
(Raviv et al., 1993).
The characteristics that are used to identify a source as an EA
can be general – e.g., a professional or social role (e.g., leader
or physician), level of education (e.g., holder of a doctorate), an
appearance in print (e.g., in a book or a newspaper) – or specific,
as when EA is assigned to a particular person, or to a particular
newspaper (Kruglanski et al., 2005).
The concept of EA is akin to the notion of source credibility,
which refers to a conjunction of perceived expertise and
trustworthiness. EA can override other types of information
and exert a determining influence on individuals’ opinions and
behavior. They process the information from a source with
EA more extensively, are more certain of it, and tend to act
in accordance with its implications. In the Lay Epistemology
framework, EA functions as a ‘stopping mechanism.’ It
effects cessation of the hypothesis generation sequence and
crystallization of confident knowledge (Kruglanski et al., 2005;
Kruglanski, 2012). Individuals may be willing to follow the
financial advice of people perceived as having EA without testing
it or considering alternatives; they may also be more confident of
decisions based on recommendations given by experts with high
EA (Kruglanski et al., 2010).
The importance of EA in knowledge or judgment formation
induced researchers to try finding out what factors lend a source
EA. Recent research in health psychology has demonstrated that
patients attributed greater EA to physicians who recommended
an active treatment (inoculation or prenatal genetic tests) over
those who advised against it (i.e., recommended maintaining the
status quo) or gave no recommendation at all (Barnoy et al.,
2009, 2012; Bar-Tal et al., 2013; Stasiuk et al., 2016). Stasiuk et al.
(2016) concluded that people might be biased when judging the
level of expertise of their physicians, such that physicians who
recommend more active treatment are judged to have greater
medical EA. The robustness of the phenomenon they observed
motivated the authors to wonder whether this bias exists also in
other areas where lay people have to judge the expertise of an
advisor (e.g., in the economic, political, or legal domain). Should
this be the case, then advising a more active approach might be
a prerequisite for being accorded high EA, and serve as a kind
of a universal heuristic (action – authority; Stasiuk et al., 2016).
Following this suggestion, we conducted a series of experiments
to examine the universal nature of the action advice effect and to
test whether advising action rather than inaction positively affects
the evaluation of experts also in the domain of personal finance.
In the current research we will use the term ‘action advice’ to refer
to advice to do something or to act; this can be contrasted with
‘inaction advice,’ advice to do nothing or to maintain the status
quo. In the field of health, action advice is associated with more
aggressive treatment and more invasive medical intervention,
whereas in the financial domain it might involve taking greater
risk, taking a larger loan or just investing more money.
Interestingly, the ‘activity level’ of advice is not the only
source of bias in evaluating experts’ EA. Research conducted on
evaluations of political expertise has shown that similarity of
political views might be particularly important to evaluations of
experts’ EA. Raviv et al. (1993) reported that individuals assigned
greater EA to political leaders who shared their own opinions.
This suggests that lay evaluations of experts’ authority depends
not only on whether they recommend a more active course
but also whether their advice is consistent with clients’ a priori
expectations or opinions. The existence of the latter effect would
imply that confirmation bias is important to perceptions of an
expert’s authority.
To summarize, two psychological factors seem to influence
lay perceptions of experts’ authority: (1) the extent to which
they advise an active approach and (2) the extent to which their
advice confirms the client’s prior opinions. Research to date
suggests that lay evaluations of EA might be biased in favor of
advisors proposing larger interventions or offering advice which
is consistent with what the client expects from an expert. We
use the term ‘bias’ here because we assume that the impact of
the above two factors is independent of objective determinants
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of expertise (e.g., an expert’s experience in the field or the
correctness of her advice in the past).
Despite the fact that many empirical studies have been carried
out to test the assumptions of lay epistemic theory (Kruglanski
et al., 2005, 2010; Kruglanski, 2012) no study has directly
examined how the theory applies to lay judgments on financial
issues. Moreover, these two effects – the action advice effect and
confirmation bias – were investigated separately for two different
domains (medical and political). Previous research has not tested
how these effects interplay with each other and whether one
of them (the action advice bias) might be limited by the other
(the confirmation bias). Our study aimed to fill this gap and
investigate how two psychological effects of interest influence lay
evaluations of the authority of financial consultants. We chose
the domain of finance to test our hypotheses because consumers
who search for advice from financial consultants do not have
access to clear cues informing about the experts’ competence. In
other words, it is not obvious which factors inform about the level
of knowledge possessed by a financial advisor. On the contrary,
when patients have to judge the authority of physicians, they
might base their evaluations on such evidence as professional
title, academic degree or the place in the organizational hierarchy.
Therefore, the evaluation of EA in the financial domain seems to
depend to a higher degree on vague aspects and, as a consequence,
be more susceptible to biases such as action advice bias or
confirmation bias.
Perception of Epistemic Authority in the
Financial Domain
Although, information about how people decide who should be
considered an expert has important implications for information
exchange between lay persons and experts, to the best of
our knowledge no study in cognitive or social psychology
has examined this question directly. Many research programs
have investigated determinants of the correctness of economic
expertise and revealed cognitive errors and biases that might
limit the quality of financial advice (Camerer and Johnson, 1991;
Shanteau, 1992; Zaleskiewicz, 2011). However, little is known
about how people who are receivers of experts’ recommendations
evaluate sources of financial expertise and how they rate
their reliability. Studying lay perceptions of financial advice
would significantly contribute to a better understanding of the
psychological nature of the interaction between advisors and their
clients.
In the contemporary world people are forced to make choices
about financial activities as saving, insurance, taking out bank
loans, currency exchange and real estate transactions. To make
good choices about such activities (i.e., to make timely decisions
and choose appropriate financial instruments) individuals usually
have to turn to various sources of expert knowledge to acquire
or verify information. Understanding the biases affecting people’s
trust in experts’ financial knowledge is therefore highly relevant
to understanding consumers’ perceptions of the authority of
financial or investment consultants. For example, it may be
the case that an investment advisor’s recommendation to invest
more money in a given stock (action advice) rather than to
avoid trading (inaction advice) is likely to enhance the potential
investor’s perception of the EA of the advisor. A similar boost
to the advisor’s authority might result from a recommendation
which confirms the client in his or her preferred approach or
opinion (e.g., a client who tends to take large financial risks
might accord greater authority to an advisor who recommends
investing in risky stocks).
The main aim of this research was to examine the existence
of bias in attributions of expertise and consider possible sources
of such bias in the field of the financial expertise. Specifically, we
analyzed how the extent to which an active rather than passive
approach is advised affects the evaluation of expert’s EA and
investigated the extent to which the action advice effect is limited
by the confirmation bias.
EXPERIMENT 1: THE EFFECT OF A
RECOMMENDATION FOR ‘ACTION’ ON
LAY EVALUATIONS OF EXPERT’S
EPISTEMIC AUTHORITY
As we have pointed out earlier in this paper, people attribute
greater EA to physicians who recommend any form of treatment
than to those who advise to wait (Barnoy et al., 2012; Bar-Tal et al.,
2013; Stasiuk et al., 2016). The main goal of the first experiment
was to test whether the same effect applies to evaluations of
financial experts. In particular, we hypothesized that lay people
considering whether to take a bank loan (mortgage) would assign
greater authority to financial advisors who advised action (i.e.,
taking on the debt) rather than those who advised against this (the
more passive approach). We also manipulated experience, a more
objective source of expertise, as we hypothesized that greater EA
would be attributed to advisors with more experience. We used a
mortgage as an example of a financial product because in Poland
one of the most common reasons for meeting a financial advisor
is to discuss a mortgage.
Method
Participants
We recruited 144 employed Polish adults having their own
income (Mage = 29.18, SD = 8.57; 97 women). The reason for
selecting this group was to avoid participants who do not earn
money and have little experience with making financial decisions
(e.g., younger students). The experiment was conducted online.
The study was voluntary, anonymous and in agreement with the
guidelines of the Ethical Committee of the SWPS University of
Social Sciences and Humanities, Faculty in Wroclaw. Participants
did not receive any compensation. All materials and interactions
with participants were in Polish language.
Procedure and Measures
Participants were randomly assigned to one of the eight
conditions in a between-subjects design, with type of advice
(four levels) and advisor experience (two levels) as independent
variables. After providing personal information (age; gender) and
giving the informed consent, participants were asked to read a
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hypothetical ‘loan’ scenario. Participants were asked to imagine
that their friend and his wife were renting a flat and had been
considering for some time whether to take out a mortgage to buy
a flat or carrying on renting and had therefore visited the bank
to consult a financial advisor1. Next, they were given information
about the advice offered by the hypothetical consultant in order
to test if their evaluations of advisors’ EA would depend on
whether advisors recommended action or inaction. However,
instead of using only two manipulation levels (action vs. inaction)
we introduced four levels described above to better imitate real
life interactions between consultants and their clients. It seems
that in real life advisors’ recommendations refer to specific rather
than more general courses of action. The advice depended on
the experimental condition: (1) ‘against’ – the consultant advised
the couple against taking out a mortgage and suggested that they
should continue to rent; (2) ‘postpone’ – the consultant advised
the couple to wait half a year and monitor the market; (3) ‘small
action’ – the consultant advised taking out as small a loan as
possible; (4) ‘large action’ – the consultant advised taking out
a loan large enough to buy a flat and all the requisite home
appliances.
Finally, the scenario gave information about the advisor’s
experience. Depending on the experimental condition, the
advisor was described as having either 15 years or just 1 year of
experience as a financial consultant.
Dependent Measures
After reading the scenario participants were asked to fill in the
short version of the EA scale to provide a measure of the EA
attributed to the advisor in the scenario. The EA scale was
originally developed and validated by Raviv et al. (1993) on
the basis of the EA concept introduced by Kruglanski (1989).
The scale was widely used by other researchers to study EA in
different domains (e.g., Raviv et al., 2003; Kruglanski et al., 2005;
Madar and Bar-Tal, 2009; Barnoy et al., 2011, 2012; Bar-Tal et al.,
2013). The shortened version of the questionnaire that we used
in the present project was adapted from Barnoy et al. (2012)
and consisted of six items referring to the degree of knowledge
which the participants attributed to the advisor and the degree
to which the participants trusted the advisor’s knowledge (‘To
what extent do you think the advisor is an expert in finance?,’
‘To what extent are this advisor’s arguments based on verified
knowledge?,’ ‘To what extent do you accept what this advisor
says as correct?,’ ‘To what extent do you think that other advisors
would say the same?,’ ‘To what extent do you trust this advisor?,’
‘To what extent is this advisor a reliable source of information?’;
Cronbach’s α = 0.91). Responses were given on a six-point scale
ranging from 1= ‘definitely disagree’ to 6= ‘definitely agree.’
Auxiliary Measures (Manipulation Check)
Participants were also asked to respond to six additional items
that were included as a manipulation check to make sure
that the participants had distinguished between the different
recommendations (‘The advice was definitely against taking the
1In all experiments the financial advisors were men to avoid confounding effects
of advisor gender, we therefore use the ‘he’ pronoun when describing experimental
scenarios.
loan,’ ‘The advice was definitely to take the loan,’ ‘The advisor’s
opinion on taking the loan was positive,’ ‘The advisor’s opinion
on taking the loan was negative,’ ‘The advisor recommended
taking a small loan,’ and ‘The advisor recommended taking a large
loan’). Responses were given on a six-point scale ranging from
1= ‘definitely not to 6= ‘definitely yes.’
Results
Manipulation Check
Before testing the main research hypotheses, we performed a
manipulation check based on 4 × 2 MANOVA with the six
items described in Section “Auxiliary Measures (Manipulation
Check).” We observed a main effect of advice, Wilks λ = 0.12,
F(18,371) = 22.99, p < 0.001, η2p = 0.51, but there was no
main effect of experience, Wilks λ = 0.98, F(6,131) = 0.47,
p = 0.83, and no interaction between experience and advice,
Wilks λ = 0.88, F(18,371) = 0.90, p = 0.53. Further planned
comparisons were carried out to test the correctness of people’s
responses to specific items. These comparisons revealed that
participants were able to distinguish between the four types of
advice, thus confirming the effectiveness of the experimental
manipulation. Detailed results are presented in Supplementary
Table S1. We also calculated a new variable indicating the number
of correct answers to the manipulation check items. This variable
ranged from 0 – answers to all items were incorrect, to 6 – answers
to all items were correct. None of the participants scored 0 on this
variable, while 94.44% of them answered correctly to four or more
items used as the manipulation check.
Advisor’s Epistemic Authority
Two-factor ANOVA revealed main effects of both putatively
EA-related independent variables, namely type of advice,
F(3,136) = 7.33, p < 0.001, η2 = 0.14, and experience,
F(1,136) = 8.26, p = 0.005, η2 = 0.06. The interaction between
these two factors was not significant, F(3,136)= 0.31, p= 0.81.
Planned comparisons showed that the ‘against’ advice yielded
lower ratings of advisor EA (M = 2.85, SD = 1.01) than the
other three types of advice [‘postpone’: M = 3.44, SD = 0.80,
F(1,140) = 8.48, p = 0.004, η2 = 0.06; ‘small loan’: M = 3.69,
SD = 0.70, F(1,140) = 17.34, p < 0.001, η2 = 0.11; ‘large loan’:
M = 3.59, SD = 0.90; F(1,140) = 14.26, p < 0.001, η2 = 0.09;
Figure 1]. Ascriptions of EA to advisors who recommended
postponing the decision or taking out a loan of some sort were
similar (all Fs < 1.5, ps > 0.22).
Two-factor ANCOVA controlling for the average number of
the correct answers in the manipulation check confirmed the
significance of both main effects: type of advice, F(3,135) = 7.33,
p< 0.001, η2 = 0.14, and experience, F(1,135)= 7.57, p= 0.007,
η2 = 0.05 and the insignificance of the interaction between
these two factors, F(3,135) = 0.34, p = 0.75. The effect of the
covariant was not significant, F(3,135) = 0.26, p = 0.61. We
also calculated the two-factor ANOVA only for participants who
answered correctly to all items in the manipulation check and
it confirmed the significance of both main effects, respectively
F(3,80) = 6.184, p = 0.001, η2 = 0.19 for recommendation
and F(1,80) = 7.57, p = 0.003, η2 = 0.10 for experience. The
Frontiers in Psychology | www.frontiersin.org 4 September 2016 | Volume 7 | Article 1476
fpsyg-07-01476 September 24, 2016 Time: 15:40 # 5
Zaleskiewicz et al. Lay Evaluation of Financial Experts
FIGURE 1 | Ascriptions of epistemic authority as a function of
advisor’s experience and type of advice.
interaction between the two factors was again not significant,
F(3,80)= 0.30, p= 0.82.
We also carried out regression analysis with advice as a
dummy coded predictor and EA as the dependent variable.
The advice recommending the greatest action (‘large loan’) was
used as the reference point. There was an effect of ‘against’
advice, b = −0.73, SE = 0.19, t = −3.78, p < 0.001; but no
effect of ‘postpone’ advice, b = −0.15, SE = 0.20, t = −0.73,
p = 0.45, or ‘small loan’ advice, b = 0.10, SE = 0.20, t = 0.49,
p = 0.62. This analysis confirmed that only the ‘against’ advice –
recommending inaction – lowered the EA ascribed to a financial
advisor; the other three forms of action advice’ all resulted in
similar perceptions of the advisor’s EA.
The second main effect was related to experience. Lower EA
was assigned to the advisor if he was described as having worked
in a bank for 1 year (M = 3.18, SD = 0.93) rather than 15 years
(M = 3.59, SD= 0.81).
Discussion
The results of Experiment 1 suggest that lay people use various
cues to evaluate financial experts’ authority, including experience.
Not surprisingly, participants granted greater EA to more
experienced financial advisors. This effect indicates that people
do react reasonably to information when making judgments
about expertise as greater experience is in many cases related
to a deeper and more nuanced understanding (Klein, 1999,
2004). However, lay people show a sensitivity to cues which
may result in evaluation biases. Similarly, to experiments in the
field of judgments of medical expertise, we found that when
evaluating financial expertise lay people tended to assign greater
EA to consultants who recommended more action. It seems
that a financial consultant who advises any form of action (in
our scenario taking out some sort of loan, whether small or
large) or at least contemplating action in the future (postponing
the decision) is considered more expert than one who advises
inaction.
To summarize, Experiment 1 provided preliminary evidence
of bias in judgments of financial expertise: greater EA was
ascribed to financial experts who advised greater action. We
might speculate, however, that people who arrange to meet a
financial advisor already have an opinion on the best course of
action and that their evaluation of the expert may be influenced
by the extent to which he or she endorses that opinion. For
example, we may assume that when clients intentionally go to
the bank to discuss the possibility of taking a loan they are
already convinced that taking a loan is the best course of action
available to them. If this was the case, they might be more likely to
judge a consultant who recommends taking action as a valuable
expert. This would suggest that the action advice effect found
in Experiment 1 is only a specific manifestation of a broader
phenomenon – the confirmation bias.
In Experiment 2 we added a new variable to capture
participants’ opinions on financial activities and provide a
preliminary test of the hypothesis that evaluation of EA is subject
to a confirmation effect.
EXPERIMENT 2: THE EFFECTS OF
ACTION ADVICE AND PRIOR OPINION
ON LAY EVALUATIONS OF EXPERTS’
EPISTEMIC AUTHORITY
Experiment 2 further investigated the psychological nature of
biases people commit in evaluating financial experts. We used
the same loan scenario and the same four types of advice as in
Experiment 1, but with two modifications. In Experiment 1 the
client was described as having arranged to meet an advisor to
talk about a loan, which may have led participants to assume
that the client thought it would be a good idea to borrow the
money to buy a flat. To examine this possibility we added a
new variable to capture participants’ perception of the client’s
opinion. If evaluations of EA were predicted by the interaction
of the client’s pre-existing opinion with type of advice this would
suggest that evaluations of financial expertise are subject to
confirmation bias. We investigated whether participants would
ascribe greater authority to experts whose advice was congruent
with their perception of client’s a priori opinion on whether
taking a loan is a proper choice.
Method
Participants
We recruited 121 employed Polish adults having their own
income (Mage = 35.39, SD = 6.17; 64 women). Participants
were recruited on the streets and in two different academic
institutions. Participants provided verbal consent to participation
after the study had been described and it had been explained that
participation was voluntary, that their data would be anonymous
and that they could withdraw at any time. People who agreed
to take part in the study met the interviewer at home or in
another convenient setting (such as a university classroom) and
completed the paper-and-pencil questionnaire individually. The
study was voluntary, anonymous and in agreement with the
guidelines of the Ethical Committee of the SWPS University of
Social Sciences and Humanities, Faculty in Wroclaw. Participants
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did not receive any compensation. All materials and interactions
with participants were in Polish language.
Procedure
Participants were randomly assigned to the one of four conditions
in a between-subjects design, with type of advice as an
independent variable.
After providing personal information (age; gender)
participants were asked to read the hypothetical ‘bank loan’
scenario used in Experiment 1. We only manipulated type of
advice and did not include any information about the advisor’s
experience.
Participants read a scenario in which the consultant provided
one of the four types of advice: (1) ‘against’ – the consultant
advised the couple against taking out a mortgage and suggested
that they should continue to rent; (2) ‘postpone’ – the consultant
advised the couple to wait half a year and monitor the market;
(3) ‘small action’ – the consultant advised taking out as small a
loan as possible; (4) ‘large action’ – the consultant advised taking
out a loan large enough to buy a flat and all the requisite home
appliances.
Dependent Measures
After reading the scenario participants were asked to answer six
questions assessing how much EA they attributed to the advisor
(same as in Experiment 1, Cronbach’s α= 0.90).
Auxiliary Measures (Manipulation Check)
As in Experiment 1 participants responded to six additional items
using a six-point scale ranging from 1 = ‘definitely disagree’
to 6 = ‘definitely agree.’ These questions were included as
a manipulation check to verify that participants distinguished
between the different types of an advice. Participants also
answered one question evaluating their perception of the clients’
pre-existing opinion about taking out a loan (“What was the
client’s opinion on taking loan held before the meeting”);
responses were given on a seven-point scale ranging from
1 = ‘definitely negative’ to 7 = ‘definitely positive.’ The latter
measure was used to preliminary test the possibility of the
confirmation bias in evaluating the expert’s EA.
Results
Manipulation Check
Before testing the main research hypotheses we performed a
manipulation check based on MANOVA with the six additional
items described above. As expected, we observed a main effect of
advice, Wilks λ = 0.20, F(18,317) = 13.34, p < 0.001, η2 = 0.41.
Further planned comparisons revealed that the participants
were able to distinguish between the four types of advice, thus
confirming the effectiveness of our experimental manipulation.
Detailed results are presented in Supplementary Table S2. We
again calculated a new variable indicating the number of correct
answers to the manipulation check items, ranging from 0 –
answers to all items were incorrect, to 6 – answers to all items
were correct. None of the participants scored 0 on this variable,
while 83.47% of them answered correctly to four or more items
used as the manipulation check.
Advisor’s Epistemic Authority
One-factor ANOVA revealed a main effect of advice on perceived
EA, F(3,117) = 5.48, p = 0.001, η2 = 0.12. Planned comparisons
showed that the ‘against’ advice resulted in lower ratings of EA
(M = 3.07, SD = 1.16) than the other three types of advice
[‘postpone’: M = 3.85, SD = 1.01; F(1,117) = 7.86, p = 0.006,
η2 = 0.06; ‘small loan’: M = 4.03, SD = 0.94; F(1,117) = 12.87,
p < 0.001, η2 = 0.10; ‘large loan’: M = 3.96, SD = 1.00;
F(1,117) = 11.64, p = 0.001, η2 = 0.09]. Ascriptions of EA in
the three latter conditions were similar (all Fs < 1, ps > 0.50); it
seems that only the ‘against’ advice resulted in a lower EA rating
for the financial advisor. This result confirms the Experiment 1
finding and shows that, in general lay people are highly reluctant
to ascribe high EA to experts whose advice seems too cautious
and who try to convince clients that their best course of action is
to stick with the status quo.
The analysis of covariance (ANCOVA) controlling for the
average number of the correct answers in the manipulation
check confirmed the significance of both main effects: type of
advice, F(3,116) = 5.49, p = 0.002, η2 = 0.12. The effect of the
covariant was not significant, F(3,116) = 0.05, p = 0.82. We
also calculated the one-factor ANOVA only for participants who
answered correctly to all items in the manipulation check. It
confirmed the significance of the main effect of recommendation,
F(3,50)= 8.0, p < 0.001, η2 = 0.32.
Client’s A priori Opinion about Taking the Loan
We found no main effect of the type of advice on the perception
of clients’ a priori opinion about taking the loan, F(3,117)= 1.37;
p = 0.26. Insignificant effect for recommendations allows us to
conclude that the participants – as instructed – indeed evaluated
the client’s opinion on the bank loan that was held before meeting
with an advisor, and not a modified opinion that might have
been influenced by information obtained during this meeting.
In general, participants believed that the client held positive
opinions about the loan: one-sample t-test showed that the score
was significantly higher than the middle point of the scale,
M = 4.24, SD = 1.26, t(120) = 2.09, p = 0.038. Detailed results
are presented in Supplementary Table S3.
The Effect of Type of Advice on EA Is Moderated by
Client’s Prior Opinion on Loans
We examined whether the effect of type of advice on the advisor’s
EA was moderated by the perceptions of the client’s prior
opinion on loans. We carried out regression analysis with EA
as the dependent variable and type of advice (dummy coded;
‘large loan’ advice as reference point), client opinion on loans
and the interactions between these variables as predictors (all
variables were z-scored for the regression). The overall model
was significant, F(7,113) = 10.12, p < 0.001, R2 = 0.38. As
in Experiment 1, only ‘against’ advice affected EA (‘against’:
β = −0.35, SE = 0.09, t = −3.90, p = 0.001; ‘postpone’:
β=−0.08, SE= 0.09, t=−0.87, p= 0.38; ‘small loan’: β=−0.02,
SE = 0.09, t = −0.28, p = 0.78). Perceived client opinion
also had an effect on perceptions of EA (β = 0.49, SE = 0.09,
t = 5.71, p < 0.001). Most importantly, there was an interaction
between client opinion and ‘against’ advice, β=−0.25, SE= 0.08,
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t = −3.12, p = 0.002, whilst the other interactions involving
client opinion did not reach significance (‘postpone’: β = 0.05,
SE = 0.12, t = 0.37, p = 0.71; ‘small loan’: β = −0.01, SE = 0.08,
t =−0.08, p= 0.91).
To decompose the above moderation effect we investigated
how the relationship between ‘against’ advice and the dependent
variable (advisor’s EA) differed from the relationship between
other types of advice and EA at three levels of the moderator
(client opinion): mean, 1 SD below the mean and 1 SD above
the mean (respectively, raw score of 4.24, 2.98, and 5.5 on the
seven-point scale; see Figure 2) . ‘Against’ advice had no effect on
EA at the lowest level of client opinion (β = −0.06, SE = 0.09,
t = 0.70, p= 0.49), whereas at the intermediate and high levels it
did (β = −0.32, SE = 0.07, t = −4.24, p < 0.001 and β = −0.57,
SE = 0.11, t = −5.15, p < 0.001 respectively). As can be seen
in Figure 2, when client opinion is perceived as neutral (scores
around the midpoint of the scale) ratings of advisor EA are not
affected by the type of advice they provide, but the more positive
client opinion of loans, the stronger the conditional effect of type
of advice on perceptions of EA; if the advisor advised against
taking the loan when the client was perceived to favor doing he
was ascribed a lower level of EA than when any other type of
advice was given.
Next, we investigated this interaction using the Johnson–
Neyman regions of significance (Hayes, 2013). This detailed
analysis revealed that the effect of ‘against’ advice on EA was
significant when the client opinion score was at least 3.45 out of 7
(i.e., when the client’s prior opinion on taking loans was perceived
to be positive).
Discussion
The results of Experiment 2 replicated the findings of Experiment
1 in that lay people tended to ascribe greater authority to experts
who advised a more active approach. However, we once again
found that there was a clear difference between the evaluations
of advisors who advised against taking the loan and advisors who
gave any other type of advice. We found that experts who advised
against taking a loan were seen as less competent.
Experiment 2 showed, however, that the relationship between
type of advice and evaluations of EA can also vary according
FIGURE 2 | Epistemic authority as a function of type of advice and
perceptions of client’s prior opinion on loans.
to client opinion on the financial product in question. We
found that lay people ascribed the greatest EA to the advisor in
the scenario in which he advised taking action and where this
coincided with the client’s perceived opinion on the advisability
of taking out a loan. This result suggests that confirmation
bias might contribute to evaluations of financial experts’ EA.
However, there are two limitation of this conclusion. Firstly,
in Experiment 2 the client’s opinion was measured, and not
manipulated, what does not allow for causal conclusions.
Secondly, we found that the average measured opinion toward
a product was neutral or positive rather than negative.
Experiment 3 was carried out to address these shortcomings in
order to examine the confirmation bias effect more directly and
in more detail.
EXPERIMENT 3: CONFIRMATION BIAS
IN THE EVALUATION OF EPISTEMIC
AUTHORITY OF FINANCIAL EXPERTS
To assess the role of confirmation bias in lay evaluations of
financial expertise we decided to manipulate the hypothetical
client’s opinion of various financial products directly.
The participants were asked to imagine that their own
opinion on the whether to accept the financial product was
positive or negative. Our expectation was that if lay EA
evaluations were affected by confirmation bias providing
action advice would only enhance an advisor’s EA if it
coincided with client’s prior opinion (i.e., the client was in
favor of the proposed course of action). If the client’s prior
opinion was against taking out a loan we predicted that
action advice would have no effect on evaluations of the
advisor’s EA.
Another modification was related to the stimuli used in the
experiment. In Experiments 1 and 2 we used a bank loan as
an example of a financial product. In this experiment we used
another product (life insurance policy) to test the robustness of
the effects we had found earlier.
Method
Participants
We recruited 112 employed Polish adults having their own
income (Mage = 26.37, SD = 6.41; 94 women). Participation
in the study was voluntary and participants did not receive
any compensation. The experiment was conducted online and
participants were recruited via open groups on Facebook and
various social forums. The study was voluntary, anonymous and
in agreement with the guidelines of the Ethical Committee of
the SWPS University of Social Sciences and Humanities, Faculty
in Wroclaw. Participants did not receive any compensation.
All materials and interactions with participants were in Polish
language.
Procedure
Participants were randomly assigned to the one of four groups
in a between-subjects factorial design, with type of advice (two
levels: ‘against’; ‘for’) and client’s prior opinion (two levels:
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negative; positive) as independent variables. After they had
given informed consent and provided personal information
participants were asked to read a hypothetical scenario
concerning the purchase of life insurance. Participants were asked
to imagine that they had attended a routine meeting with the
insurance agent and that during the meeting the discussion had
turned to life insurance. They were then presented with the
consultant’s advice, accompanied by a very short justification. In
this experiment only two advice conditions were used: ‘against’
life insurance (advice not to buy) and ‘for’ life insurance (advice to
buy). We limited the number of conditions, because Experiments
1 and 2 showed that people only differentiated between extreme
inaction advice and all other forms of advice when evaluating the
advisor’s EA. Moreover, using two levels of advice manipulation
allowed for a more effective examination of the confirmation bias
effect. In the ‘against’ condition the consultant advised against
buying the life insurance product as it was quite expensive
whereas in the ‘pro’ condition the consultant advised buying the
insurance product as it was quite cheap.
The consultant’s advice was followed by a brief description of
the participant’s opinion. In the ‘positive’ condition participants
were asked to imagine that they were interested in this kind
of insurance, because one of their friends who had already
purchased it said that it was very profitable. In the ‘negative’
condition participants were asked to imagine that they were not
convinced that life insurance was worthwhile because their friend
who had already purchased it said that it was very unprofitable.
Dependent Measure
After reading the scenario participants were asked to answer
the same six questions assessing EA as in the two previous
experiments (Cronbach’s α= 0.91).
Results
A two (type of advice: against; for) by two (client opinion:
positive; negative) ANOVA with advisor’s EA as the dependent
variable was used to test the main hypothesis. There was no
main effect of type of advice, F(1,108) = 0.03, p = 0.86,
or client opinion, F(1,108) = 0.373, p = 0.543. As expected,
the two independent factors interacted with each other,
F(1,108)= 14.118, p < 0.001, η2 = 0.116 (see Figure 3).
Further planned comparisons revealed that when client
opinion of life insurance products was positive the participants
ascribed greater EA to advisors who recommended purchasing it
(M = 3.56, SD= 0.87) than to those who recommended rejecting
it [M = 2.99, SD = 0.84; F(1,108) = 5.99, p = 0.016, η2 = 0.05].
However, when client opinion was negative the reverse pattern
applied, ‘against’ advice was associated with higher EA ratings
(M = 3.68, SD= 0.89) than the ‘for’ advice [M = 3.06, SD= 0.70;
F(1,108)= 8.33, p= 0.005, η2 = 0.07].
Discussion
Experiment 3 supported the hypothesis that lay evaluations of
the financial experts’ EA are affected by confirmation bias. The
participants tended to ascribe greater EA to advisors whose
advice was congruent with the client’s prior opinion. This result
also suggests that there are limits to the action advice effect
FIGURE 3 | Perceived epistemic authority of advisors as a function of
their advice and client opinion on purchasing life insurance.
demonstrated in Experiments 1 and 2. It seems that lay people
tend to ascribe greater EA to financial consultants who give action
advice (e.g., to purchase a financial product) only if this advice
is consistent with their own opinion (e.g., they also think that
purchasing the product in question is a good idea).
GENERAL DISCUSSION
The most important aim of this project was to examine how
lay people who do not possess a professional knowledge in
economics evaluate financial consultants differing in their advice.
In particular, the three experiments presented in this paper
tested how the two psychological effects – the effect of an action
advice and the confirmation bias – might contribute to our
understanding of lay evaluation of EA in the field of finance.
Experiments 1 and 2 showed that the action advice effect that
favors physicians advising aggressive treatment (Barnoy et al.,
2012; Bar-Tal et al., 2013; Stasiuk et al., 2016) might also hold
in the financial field. Data collected in these two experiments
revealed that financial consultants who advised against taking
out a bank loan (i.e., who advised inaction) received worse EA
evaluations than those who suggested a less inactive approach
(i.e., at the very least recommended postponing the decision or
advised taking out a loan immediately). However, it cannot be
excluded that clients who arrange to meet a financial advisor
already have a positive opinion on a more active course of action
and that their evaluation of the expert may be influenced by the
extent to which he or she advices action. If this was the case,
they might be more likely to judge a consultant who recommends
taking action as a valuable expert. This interpretation suggests
that the action advice effect found in Experiment 1 might have
been only a specific manifestation of a broader phenomenon –
the confirmation bias.
Indeed, the outcomes of Experiment 2 and, particularly,
Experiment 3 suggested that the action advice effect might
result from clients’ desire to confirm their own opinions. In
Experiment 3 participants only ascribed greater authority to
an advisor who recommended accepting the financial product
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in question (life insurance) when they held a positive opinion
of the product. Participants with a negative opinion of the
product tended to ascribe greater EA to an advisor who
advised rejecting it. This interaction between type of advice
and client opinion suggests that there are limits to the action
advice effect described earlier. The action advice effect seems
to influence lay evaluations only when the people’s opinions or
preferences are ambiguous or not salient. Another possibility
is that relying on the action advice cue in evaluations of EA
is simply another reflection of confirmation bias: when lay
people are uncertain of their own beliefs, they try to confirm
a common belief that experts should advise action rather than
maintenance of the status quo. This possibility warrants further
research.
Why are people prone not only to the action advice effect
but also to confirmation bias when evaluating financial advisors’
EA? Nickerson (1998, p. 175) argues that confirmation bias
“connotes the seeking or interpreting of evidence in ways that
are partial to existing beliefs, expectations, or a hypothesis in
hand.” This definition suggests that confirmation bias amounts
to a selective search for information and discrimination in
the use of it. In other words, it is described as a purely
cognitive inclination. However, confirmation bias might also
be understood as a part of the broader phenomenon of
‘motivated reasoning’ (Kunda, 1987, 1990; Molden and Higgins,
2005; Mercier and Sperber, 2011). Research has shown that
people engage in ‘motivated thinking’ to defend their beliefs
and to preserve a positive view of themselves (Mercier and
Sperber, 2011) or to minimize negative and maximize positive
affective states (Westen et al., 2006). Even if lay people do
not have an expert knowledge of a given area and hence feel
that they have to turn to an expert for advice, it does not
necessarily mean that they do not have opinions or beliefs
on issues in the area. Lay people often hold naïve theories of
reality (e.g., economic reality; see Furnham and Lewis, 1986;
Lea et al., 1987) that help them to structure and understand
the world surrounding them. One reason for consulting an
expert might be to confirm a personal theory or belief. For
example, if an individual thinks that investing in stocks is a
good long-term saving strategy then receiving advice which
supports this opinion from a consultant would be not only
help him or her to make a decision about how to invest
but would also be psychologically rewarding. If, however, an
expert provides advice which contradicts a lay person’s beliefs
that person might try to devalue or discredit the advice by
underestimating the authority of the expert who provided
it in order to shore up their prior position. Evaluation of
experts’ EA would thus be influenced by the basic drive to
reduce cognitive dissonance (Festinger, 1957). Further research
should be conducted to examine this possibility in more
depth. Future experiments should focus on what happens when
people’s opinions are ambiguous or implicit. We predict that
in these circumstances lay people’s evaluations of experts’ EA
might be subject to a bias to confirm various external sources
of knowledge (e.g., common beliefs, opinions of a trusted
individual).
Another issue that warrants exploration in future experiments
is the role of people’s own financial knowledge. The authors of
lay epistemic theory introduced the concept of self-epistemic
authority (SEA) to capture individuals’ perceptions of their
own competence in a given field (Ellis and Kruglanski, 1992;
Raviv et al., 1992). It seems plausible that financial SEA
would influence perceptions of the EA of financial experts.
We hypothesize that an individual with high SEA would
find the endorsement of her opinion by an expert validating
and would ascribe higher EA to an expert whose advice is
compatible with her opinions. For individuals with low SEA,
however, having one’s opinion endorsed by an expert would
evoke ambivalent feelings and hence low SEA individuals
might ascribe a lower EA to this expert (Kruglanski et al.,
2005).
Do the results of this study mean that people only use
superficial cues when evaluating the authority of financial
experts and that their evaluations will inevitably be biased?
Experiment 1 suggested that people might also base their
judgments on more objective sources of information. Our
participants EA ratings suggested that they believed that greater
weight should be given to the opinion of more experienced
advisors. However, this experiment also showed that lay
peoples’ evaluations of financial experts could be dominated
by superficial rather than objective cues. Data analysis revealed
that the EA evaluations were more strongly influenced by
recommendation than experience. Lay people typically turn to
experts for help in making better, more thorough decisions;
however, our three experiments showed that when selecting a
financial advisor the need to receive an advice for action or
the desire to confirm one’s own beliefs might prevail over the
need for objective information about the quality of financial
advice.
The current experimental project certainly holds its
limitations. Firstly, all three experiments used only hypothetical
scenarios presenting the interaction between a lay person
and a financial advisor. Moreover, the participants were
asked to evaluate an advisor without being requested to
make even hypothetical decisions. Secondly, the participants
were not incentivized. In our future research we are going
to study judgments and choices in more naturalistic
situations in which people will have a chance to either
accept or reject advisor’s recommendations when making
their decisions. Using real incentives will allow us to test
whether the results found in the present project hold
when the subject’s own money is at stake. Certainly, an
ideal solution would be to conduct field experiments in
which we might study behaviors of customers making real
financial decisions and taking advice from real financial
experts.
The results presented in this paper have important practical as
well as theoretical implications. Engelmann et al. (2009) reported
that financial advice might ‘oﬄoad’ people’s own opinions
when making decisions about risk-taking. These authors found
that when expert advice was available, lay people tended
to make choices following it. Moreover, neurophysiological
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data showed that neural activation was not correlated with
evaluations of options with different levels of risk in the
presence of an expert recommendation. Later research by
Engelmann et al. (2012) also showed that the behavioral impact
of the advice is likely influenced by the amount of personal
experience with the type of decision that the advice is related
to. These authors report that the enhanced effect of advice
from an expert economist on risky financial decisions was
observed in younger adolescents, compared to adults who
typically have more experience in making financial choices
under risk. This implies that lay people, and especially those
whose experience is extremely poor, might rely unthinkingly
on professional advice without carefully analyzing accessible
alternatives. This importance of such an effect is clear when
it is linked with our results showing that lay evaluations of
expert advice are biased. Lay decision-makers who use financial
advice and evaluate its source as highly competent should
consider the real basis for that evaluation. One recommendation
that could be made to consumers of financial advice on
the basis of the results presented here is that they should
consider both advice that is compatible with their beliefs and
advice that is not in order to minimize their vulnerability to
bias.
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